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Institutional Quality, Financial Inclusion
and Inclusive Growth: Causality
Evidence from Nigeria
Olanrewaju. G. O, Tella, S. A. and Adesoye, B. A.
Abstract
The study examines the causal interactions among the institutional, financial and inclusive
growth variables by employing Toda-Yamamoto (TY) Granger non-causality test within
the augmented VAR framework. Annual time series, data from 1998 to 2017, were used.
The TY analysis showed that all the variables, with the exception of financial inclusion
index, Granger-caused inclusive growth, but without any evidence of feedback.
However, a bidirectional causal relationship was found between inclusive finance and
the interaction of institutional quality and financial inclusion. Thus, the null hypothesis of
block exogeneity can be refuted when real GDP per person employed (RGDPE) is taken
as the dependent variable. This implies that while the effects of institutional quality could
vary widely in an economy, institutional quality appears to be the dominant driving force
behind inclusive growth. It is, therefore, recommended that institutional improvement,
beyond the present liberal democratic threshold, is much needed to effectively harness
the human capital resource-base. The Nigerian government should adopt a labourintensive development strategy, such that poor active households are comprehensively
integrated into productive activities for optimal value-chain finance-growth inclusiveness.
This should be able to address the protracted tripartite socio-economic problems of
poverty, inequality and unemployment in line with Lin’s comparative advantage
conforming hypothesis.
Keywords: Institutional Quality, Financial inclusion, Development Strategy, Inclusive
Growth and Causality
JEL Classification: O43, G21, P28, O15

I.

Introduction

A

key development issue is investigating the causes of lingering
underdevelopment of the resources-endowed low-income developing
countries (LIDCs), particularly Sub-Sahara African countries. A number of
questions on these issues are of vital importance, and these are raised as follows:
What is the nature and trend of institutional quality, financial inclusion and
inclusive growth in Nigeria? Are there causal links among the variables of
institutional quality, financial inclusion and inclusive growth, as measured by the
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real GDP per person employed in the resource-rich and labour-abundant
Nigerian economy? To what extent has institutional quality impacted on the link
between financial inclusion and broad-based productive employment growth
in Nigeria?
Undoubtedly, these questions have continued to motivate a sizeable body of
scholarship over the last few decades, but with two main divergent views on the
role of institutions of political governance in development. Several scholars (
such as La Portal, et al., 1998; Glaesier, et al., 2004; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013;
Tella & Ayinde, 2015; Kebede & Takyi, 2017; Olanrewaju, 2018) stress that
institutional factor is endogenous to a country’s financial development and
economic growth and thus, considerably accounts for growth variance, both
across countries and over time within countries. In this view, finance-growth
nexus is assumed as an outcome of institutional quality. However, the link from
institutions, through financial development, to growth remains critically
controversial in developing economies like Nigeria. Other authors (Sachs, 2005;
Durlauf, et al., 2005; Kurtz & Schrank, 2007; Rodrik, 2008; Briguglio, 2016), on the
other hand, hold a different theoretical perspective on the link between
institutional quality and growth. They dismiss governance, and assert that poor
countries cannot afford quality institutions of governance. Therefore, the
existence of causality running from institutional quality through financial
inclusion, to such a broad-based productive employment growth becomes
highly uncertain, and could as well run the other way.
Traditionally, institutions of political governance are designed to perform specific
functions, like the formulation and implementation of socio-economic policies
for a broad-based productive employment growth and development. The
effectiveness of the state to successfully, or otherwise, achieve this constitutional
goal determines its quality (UNDP, 2011). Thus, prioritising the quality of
institutional governance is the fulcrum upon which other drivers of inclusive
growth must rest and revolve, in order to solve the protracted socio-economic
problems of pervasive poverty, huge inequality gaps and ‘jobless growth’
plaguing many low-income developing economies. Unfortunately, recognising
the centrality of institution in achieving an inclusive growth in these economies
remains a challenge (Saez, 2012; Stiglitz, 2016).
The industrialised economies, like the United States and Europe, the Newly
Industrialised Economies (NIEs) in Asia, and the BRICS’ countries (Brazil, Russia,
India, China and South Africa) have more than 75 per cent of their population
having access to financial services for productive activities (Martinez & Mlachila,
2013; Jerome, 2016). Countries with stronger institutions have higher levels of
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financial inclusion and equitable growth (Ozughalu & Ogwumike, 2015). For
instance, countries that took off and caught up with the advanced economies
in the last three to four decades, or so, were mostly labour-abundant East Asian
economies but with strong institutions. In contrast, for instance, the population in
many low middle-income developing countries (LMIDCs), generally, and
Nigeria, in particular, have limited access to formal financial services. About 42
per cent of the adult population precisely are currently financially-excluded in
Nigeria (EFInA, 2017).
Interestingly, with the unbroken democratic rule in Nigeria since 1999, it is
imperative to see how the ‘improved’ political governance has helped in
fostering inclusive growth in the country. This study, therefore, is guided by the
work done on the financial inclusion-growth link, and the belief that the quality
of institutions underlies the causal interactions between financial inclusion and
inclusive growth. Using the Toda-Yamamoto Granger non-causality procedure
within the augmented VAR framework, the study investigated the causal
interactions among the variables of institutional quality, financial inclusion,
technology choice index and real GDP per person employed. The rest of the
paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the review of literature on the
relationship between inclusive growth and institutional quality. Section 3
describes the data and methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical results,
while Section 5 concludes the paper.

II.

Literature Review

Many researchers have asserted that the level of growth and development in
most emerging economies is determined, to a very large extent, by the quality
of institutions (La Porta, et al., 1998; Rodrik, et al., 2006; Haq and Zia, 2006; Eicher
and Rohn, 2007; Zhuang, et al., 2010; Chang, 2011; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013;
Iheonu, et al., 2017; Kebede & Takyi, 2017; Olanrewaju, 2018). This suggests that
countries with relatively high institutional quality in terms of capacity and
character tend to formulate and implement policies and programmes that
would more quickly break the ‘mould’ of long-aged pervasive poverty, huge
inequality gaps and mounting unemployment rate, characterising most
developing economies across the globe.
From a cross-country perspective, La Porta, et al., (1998) assessed the
determinants of the quality of governments in 152 countries, using government
performance measures, such as public-sector efficiency, public good provision,
size of government, and political freedom. The study found that countries that
are poor, close to the equator, ethnolinguistically-heterogeneous, use French or
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socialist laws, or have high proportions of Catholics or Muslims exhibit inferior
government performance. Moreover, the authors stressed that the larger the
government size, the better the performance and vice-versa. Therefore, factors
such as, the economic, political, and cultural theories of institutions explain the
variations in differential growth patterns across countries.
Ajayi (2002) examined the theory and facts of how the quality of institutions and
policies applied to the African situation. He argued that the missing link in Africa’s
growth process is the absence of adequate policies and efficient institutions. He
found that corruption, ethno-linguistic fractionalisation and civil strife are the
institutional quality measures that have deleterious effects on growth. He also
found that the conventional economic factors responsible for growth in Africa
generally, and Nigeria in particular, do not fully explain its growth process. The
study is relevant to the present as it has created useful insight into the problem,
which the present study sets out to solve.
Consistent with Ajayi’s findings, Sachs (2005) described the less developed
countries (LDCs) as being caught in a structural poverty trap, due to severe
underdevelopment of their productive capacity. He contends that in spite of
these odds, LDCs still have a latent potential for evolving national inclusive and
sustainable development strategies, capable of breaking the vicious circle of
underdevelopment and poverty within the framework of mixed economies,
properly regulated by lean, clean and democratic developmental states. He
strongly opines that ‘development from within is the best, if not the unique
opportunity; and that genuine development of Africa cannot happen by
replicating foreign models. This study further provides the desired stimulus for the
present study. The policy implication of findings is that a ‘home grown’ inclusive
framework should evolve for the triple-win solutions to the tripartite socioeconomic problems.
Rodrik, et al. (2006) examined the respective contributions of institutions,
geography, and trade in determining income levels around the world for
categories of two datasets in 79 and 137 countries, using the institutional quality
measures due to Kaufmann, et al. (2010). The results show that the quality of
institutions ‘trumps’ everything else. Once institutions are controlled for,
conventional measures of geography have, at best, weak direct effects on
incomes, even though they have a strong indirect effect on the quality of
institutions. Similarly, once institutions are controlled for, trade almost becomes
insignificant with the ‘wrong’ negative sign.
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In a much-related study, Haq and Zia (2006) explored the relationship between
good governance and pro-poor growth in Pakistan from 1996 to 2005, utilising
three broad indicators of governance: political governance (i.e., voice and
accountability, political instability and violence); economic governance (i.e.,
government effectiveness and regulatory quality); and institutional dimensions
of governance (i.e., rule of law, control of corruption). The study tested for the
linkage between governance and poverty (as well as governance and income
inequality), using simple ordinary least square (OLS) regressions. The basic
findings are that “voice and accountability and political stability are negatively
and significantly correlated with poverty.” The study is relevant to the present
study, as it provides a suitable framework for the role of institutional governance
in the context of sustainable inclusive growth. The policy implication is that in
developing a model of inclusive growth, the strategic role of government
cannot be overemphasised.
Reviewing the empirical evidence on institutional determinants of differential
economic performance, Eicher and Rohn (2007) developed an array of
endogenously-selected and weighted economic indicators that are combined
into one index of institutional quality in the OECD countries for the period 1994
to 2006. They observed that despite evidence in favor of convergence, the
impact of institutions on economic growth in the advanced and highly
industrialised countries, widely considered as ‘first world’, has not been fully
explored. However, they argue that strong explanatory power can be attributed
to institutional factors in the global sample of countries.
Zhuang, et al. (2010) took a closer look at two critical issues of governance and
institutional quality measurement and the direction of causality between
institutional development and economic development in the developing Asian
countries. Applying a simple classification framework under the widely used
world governance indicators (WGIs), they found that the Asian economies with
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of law scored above the
global means and grew faster on average during the period 1998-2008, than
those economies below the global means. Their findings are also consistent with
Levy and Fukuyama (2010) who found that, improving governance in these
three dimensions could be used as potential entry points of development
strategies for many other developing economies in the region and elsewhere.
In another study, Ajakaiye and Jerome (2011) examined the role of institutions in
the transformative agenda of the Nigerian economy and conducted a
comparative analysis of Nigeria and Indonesia. The analysis of both countries
revealed that the economic institutions and political framework were stronger in
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Indonesia than Nigeria. However, going by the current reforms in the various
sectors in Nigeria, the country can place itself on the path of prosperity by
emphasising the need for institutional strengthening and reinvigorating
manufacturing sector, which has been regarded as a key driver of structural
transformation.
In another study, Tella (2012) reviewed the empirical studies on theoretical
constructs of economic growth and development models from the classical to
the endogenous and inclusive growth. The review showed that while a number
of emerging countries (e.g. Malaysia, Singapore, Bangladesh, Mexico, and the
BRICS’ countries with the exception of Russia) could link their development plans
to specific models that provides avenue for measurement and evaluations, the
Nigerian growth and development programmes, since independence, are
hardly based explicitly on any growth model. However, he concludes that, the
route to sustainable development is, firstly, financial inclusiveness, which will then
translate to inclusive growth. Thus, an important policy organ like the Central
Bank of Nigeria should be able to direct or re-direct the nation’s vision towards
financial inclusion in order to engender inclusive growth, for such has significantly
assisted many developing and emerging countries to overcome the issues of
chronic poverty and inequalities in recent times.
In order to capture the institutional quality in the dataset of 94 to 109 countries,
from 1990 to 2010, Kuncic (2013) computed the latent institutional quality
variables, clustering around three homogenous groups of formal institutions:
legal, economics and political. Findings from the study revealed that many
developed countries (North America, Australia, central and northern Europe or
Japan), in terms of income, longevity and literacy, are ranked the best with the
calculated institutional quality variables strongly correlating with real GDP per
capita, and with the strength of correlation in the order of legal, economic and
political institutional quality. In contrast, the least developed countries (South
and Central America, Sub-Sahara Africa, etc.), have worst quality of all the three
sets of institutions.
Lin and Chang (2014), empirically investigated the effects of the comparative
advantage conforming (CAC) and comparative advantage defying (CAD)
strategies on economic performance, for a sample of 122 countries for the
period 1962-1999. As a proxy variable for CAD, the author used the relative size
of capital-intensive production, while also including a variety of institutional
control variables (index of economic freedom, the costs of starting a business,
ratio of trade dependence etc.). The results indicated that the CAD strategy
indeed has a statistically significant negative effect on growth and leads to an
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increase in inequality. The author asserted that, while CAC or CAD development
strategy cannot be assessed in an institutional vacuum, a country should follow
its comparative advantage in order to develop. Moreover, the government that
adopted a CAD as against CAC, encouraging firms to ignore the existing
comparative advantages of the economy would be full of rent-seeking and
unproductive profit-seeking activities, which hinder economic growth and
development.
Benchmarking the framework for assessing the inclusiveness of the process and
benefits of growth in 112 economies across all geographies and stages of
development, the World Economic Forum (2015) analysed and presented the
results of the 1st edition of the inclusive growth and development with
benchmarks spanning seven policy areas and fifteen sub-areas, while work on
refining the data and methodology would continue in two respects. These are
improvement of the indicators and empirical investigation of the relative
significance of sub-policy pillars. To overcome the challenge, the key factors of
the institutional-enabling environment have been regarded as determinative of
the quality of growth over time, measured by levels of productive employment
and median household income. This study appears to be relevant to the present
study as it provides basis for constructing the model for inclusive and sustainable
development.
In another study, Iheonu, Ihedimma and Onwuanaka (2017) employed four
institutional quality indicators control of corruption, government effectiveness,
regulatory quality and rule of law using data set of 12 West African countries
from 1996 to 2015 to assess the impact of institutional quality on economic
performance. The result showed that all the indicators of institutional quality
have positive and significant impact on economic performance when the fixed
and random effect estimation technique was employed. However, only
government effectiveness was found to be significant after considering the
variable endogeneity using the panel two-stage least technique. The study
recommended for improved institutions to enhance economic performance in
West Africa. It also emphasised the need for more effective governance.
Kebede and Takyi (2017) employed the Wald panel causality technique to
investigate whether institutional quality is the consequence or cause of
economic growth in 27 Sub-Sahara African countries. While the co-integration
test results show evidence of a long-run relationship between institutional quality
and economic growth, the causality test results provide a unidirectional
causality from economic growth to institutional quality but with no evidence of
causality from institutional quality to economic growth. However, debt servicing
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and dependence on natural resources were, respectively, found to be
negatively affecting economic growth and institutional quality. This conclusion
suggests the case of resource cursed situations as being the lots of low- and low
middle-income developing countries like Nigeria.
Olanrewaju (2018) also examined the relationships between institutional quality,
financial inclusion and inclusive growth in the resource-rich and labourabundant Nigerian economy using the Bounds testing approach to
cointegration within an ARDL framework. The results showed that while the
evidence of financial inclusion and institutional factors positively related to
inclusive growth, the relationship between the real GDP per person employed
(RGDP) as a measure of inclusive growth and the interacted variable of
institutional quality and financial inclusion (IFIGEFe) equally revealed a positive
and statistically significant relationship. However, the composite institutional
quality index appeared to be the dominant driving force behind growth
inclusiveness in the economy. The implication of the findings is that institutional
factors could be said to have an overall significant impact on inclusive growth
in Nigeria.
Although existing empirical research have established the links between
institutions and differential growth paths across countries, country-specific
studies that address the issue of causality running from institutional quality
through financial inclusion to inclusive growth are sparse. In addition, there is no
study to the best of our knowledge that considered the combined effects that
institutional quality and financial inclusion could have on growth inclusiveness in
Nigeria. Therefore, in filling the gaps, this study determines the causal interactions
among the socio-economic variables of institutional quality, financial inclusion
and real GDP per person employed in Nigeria from 1998 to 2017, using TodaYamamoto Granger non-causality test within the augmented VAR framework.

III.
III.1

Methodology
Model and Data

Tobin (1955) dynamic aggregative production function, which stresses the
importance of both resources and monetary expansion in the growth process,
can be considered as the theoretical base for ‘the new growth path’. It is,
generally, assumed that there is a causal link between inclusive growth and
institutional governance, as well as, other control variables, such as financial
inclusion, human capital development, civil society (Levy & Fukuyama, 2010),
and preferred development strategy, technology choice index (CAC) as
against (CAD) (Lin & Chang, 2014; Bruno, et al., 2015). Thus, the growth patterns
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in an economy reflect the country’s institutional and contextual environment,
which is compatible with the endowment structure of the country and its
potential comparative advantage. While the quality of institutions in terms of
capacity and character is an influencing factor (exogenous) on the one hand,
it is equally an endogenous variable (being influenced by other factors), on the
other hand (Tella & Ayinde, 2015).
The major focus of this study is to explore the interactive causal linkage among
variables of interest, following Hufty (2011) and Djezou (2014) on the nexus
between inclusive growth and the quality of institutional governance. The model
can be specified as:
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝐹𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐺𝐸𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐼𝐹𝐼 ∗ 𝐺𝐸𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑇𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡

(1)

where RGDPE (as proxy for participation and benefit-sharing in the growth
process) represents the productive contribution of the actual working
population which captures the problems of poverty, inequality and
unemployment. IFI represents a composite financial indicator capturing
information on various dimensions of financial inclusion (accessibility (proxied by
Accounts ownership per 1000 population), availability (measured by the number
of bank branches or the number of ATMs per 100,000 population, and usage),
GEF refers to the Worldwide Governance Indicators average. RGDPE and IFIGEF,
respectively, represent interactions of inclusive growth variable with institutional
quality and financial inclusion. TCI is constructed as the value-added to labour
ratio in manufacturing over the total value-added to aggregate labour force
ratio, to capture the impact of structural transformation in a resource-rich and
labour-abundant developing nation like Nigeria (Lin & Chang, 2014). A high TCI
value is, therefore, indicative that a country follows a CAD strategy as opposed
to a CAC strategy. Annual data from 1998 to 2017 were used and were sourced
from the Central Bank of Nigeria, National Bureau of Statistics, IMF’s International
Financial Statistics (IFS), and the World Bank.

III.2

Estimation Techniques

To address the causality issues, the study used the Toda and Yamamoto (1995)
Granger non-causality technique to examine the causal relationships among
the variables of interest (real GDP per person employed, financial inclusion
indicator and institutional capacity of the state) in Nigeria. As pointed out by
Toda and Yamamoto (hereafter TY), if the system contains unit roots or if there is
uncertainty as to whether the variables are I(0) or I(1), the TY technique is more
appropriate for its relatively small size distortions, thus, overcoming the problems
of arbitrary level of integration and sensitive values of the nuisance parameters

47

48 Central Bank of Nigeria

Economic and Financial Review

September 2019

in the ECM procedures. The TY introduced a Wald test statistic that
asymptotically has a chi square (X2) distribution, irrespective of the order of
integration or cointegration properties of the variables.
The TY approach employed a modified Wald test for restrictions on the
parameters of the VAR (k); where k is the lag length of the system. The basic idea
of the TY approach is to artificially augment the correct order, k, by the maximal
order of integration, d. Once this is done, a (k + d) order of VAR is estimated and
the coefficients of the last lagged d vectors are ignored. The TY augmented
Granger causality test conducted was based on the multivariate system of
equations formulated as follows:
𝑘
𝑘+𝑑
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑𝑘𝑖=1 𝜃𝑖 𝑌𝑡−𝑖 + ∑𝑘+𝑑
𝑖=𝑘+1 𝜃𝑖 𝑌𝑡=𝑖 + ∑𝑖=1 𝛿𝑖 𝑋𝑡−𝑖 + ∑𝑖=𝑘+1 𝛿𝑖 𝑋𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑣1𝑡

(2)

𝑘
𝑘+𝑑
𝑋𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑𝑘𝑖=1 𝜑𝑖 𝑋𝑡−𝑖 + ∑𝑘+𝑑
𝑖=𝑘+1 𝜑𝑖 𝑋𝑡−𝑖 + ∑𝑖=1 𝜋𝑖 𝑌𝑡−𝑖 + ∑𝑖=𝑘+1 𝜋𝑖 𝑌𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑣2𝑡

(3)

Where 𝑋𝑡 represents institutional quality, 𝑌𝑡 depicts the real GDP per person
employed as a measure of inclusive growth, and 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜃 ′ 𝑠, 𝛿 ′ 𝑠, 𝜑 ′ 𝑠, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜋 ′ 𝑠 are
parameters of the model. While k and d are respectively optimum lag length of
a VAR and maximal order of integration of the variables, 𝑣1𝑡 and 𝑣2t are the
independent white noise residuals with zero mean and constant variance.
Granger causality implies that if it is only the lagged values of the institutional
quality variables in equation (2) that are significant, we can infer that institutional
quality Granger-causes inclusive growth. On the other hand, if the lagged
independent variables in the two equations are significant, then we can infer a
bi-directional causality. However, if it is only the lagged value of inclusive growth
variable in equation (3) that is significant, we conclude that inclusive growth
Granger-causes institutional quality. In other words, we can jointly test if the
estimated lagged coefficients are different from zero using the F-statistic. When
the joint test rejects the two null hypotheses that the lagged coefficients are not
different from zero, causal relationship between the variables is thereby
confirmed.

IV.
IV.1

Results and Discussion
Unit Root Tests

The paper used Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP)
techniques to test for the presence of unit root in the series. Table 1 shows that
all the series with the exception of logarithm of the technology choice index
(LTCI), are not found to be stationary at level with constant and time trend. This
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shows that the variables LRGDPE, IFI, GEFe, RGDPE*GEFe and IFI*GEFe are
stationary at first difference.
Table 1: Unit Root Tests (Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Philips-Perron (PP)
Variables/Tests

t-statistics

Critical
Value

Levels

t-statistics

Critical
Value
First Difference

Order of
Integration

ADF Test
LNRGDPE
IFI
TCI
GEFe
RGDPEGEFe
IFIGEFe

-2.7966
-1.6285
-5.0377**
-2.2221
-2.8151
-1.6729

3.6736
-3.6908
-3.8753
-3.6908
-3.6908
-3.6908

-4.7982**
-3.3672*
-5.8491*
-4.9752**
-4.9904**
-3.8433*

-3.6908
-3.0522
-3.1754
-3.7105
-3.7105
-3.0522

I(1)
I(1)
I(0)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)

PP Test
LNRGDPE
IFI
TCI
GEFe
RGDPEGEFe
IFIGEFe

-2.7966
-1.8030
-1.4678
-2.0175
-2.8151
-1.6729

-3.6736
-3.6908
-4.6679
-3.6908
-3.6908
-3.6908

-4.8848**
-3.3766*
-2.0946
-4.9752**
-5.1956**
-3.9091*

-3.6908
3.2978
-1.9628
-3.7104
-3.7105
-3.7105

I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)

Note: The asterisk (*, **,***) denote the rejection of the unit root hypothesis at the1%, 5% and 10%
significance levels respectively.
Source: Authors, 2019

Essentially, the null hypothesis for the presence of unit root was rejected for all
the variables except technology choice index (TCI) at levels, indicating that all
the series were stationary at first difference.

IV.2

Optimal Lag Length Selection

To determine the optimal lag length, we specified a VAR (1) model and applied
the conventional selection criteria. The results of lag length selection of the VAR
are presented in Table 2. Final Prediction Error (FPE), Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC), Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQ), the Sequential Modified (LR) and Schwarz
Information Criterion (SC) recommended a lag length of one (1). Thus, we settled
for the optimum lag length of VAR as 1 via the four criteria. The diagnostic test
results indicate that neither the augmented VAR (3) (k + d = 3) nor the VAR (4) (k
+ d = 4) is stable. Hence, we estimated the augmented VAR (2) (k + d = 2) with
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𝑉𝑡 = f(LNRGDPE, TCI, IFI, GEFe, RGDPEGEFe, IFIGEFe) and conducted a series of
diagnostic tests to check the robustness of VAR (2).
Table 2 Results of the Lag Length Selection
Endogenous Variables (LNRGDPE LNTCI IFI GEFe RGDPEGEFe IFIGEFe)
LagLogL
LR
FPE
AIC
SC
HQ
0

-26.11699NA

1.43e-06

3.568555

3.865345

3.609478

1

58.52253 103.4483*

8.33e-09*

-1.835837*

0.241697*

-1.549373*

* indicates lag order selected by the criterion
Source: Authors, 2019

IV.2

Results of Causal Interaction among Institutional Quality, Financial
Inclusion and Inclusive Growth using Toda-Yamamoto Granger
Causality Tests

The main focus of this study was to investigate the causal interactions among
the series, with the aim of determining the directions of causation among them,
especially in the lower middle-income economy of Nigeria during the period.
Table 3 reports that institutional quality indicator, the measure of interacted
institutional-inclusive growth (RGDPEGEFe) and all the variables as a group were
found to Granger-cause inclusive growth (LNRGDPE). However, causality runs
from real GDP per person employed, financial inclusion, institutional quality, as
well as, the interacted institutional-inclusive growth variables to interacted
institutional-inclusive finance variable (IFIGEFe), and all the variables in the
model combined. The causality analysis exposed a one-way causal relationship
among the variables with the exception of index of financial inclusion. However,
a bidirectional causality exists between the interacted institutional-finance
indicator and financial inclusion index. Meanwhile, the study found evidence of
the preferred development strategy variable (TCI) Granger causing the GDP per
person employed, as a measure of inclusive growth, in the long-run without any
feedback relationship observed. The same was true for the causal relationship
between technology choice index and financial inclusion indicator (IFI).
The real GDP per person employed (LNRGDPE) neither unilaterally Grangercause institutional quality nor technology choice index. When GEFe is taken as
the dependent variable, the chi-square statistics of 0.405, 1.720, 1.556, 0.324 and
1.638 for LNRGDPE, TCI, IFI, RGDPEGEFe and IFIGEFe, respectively are not
significant (see Appendix A). Thus, the null hypothesis of block exogeneity is not
refuted when GEFe is taken as the regressand in the model. Similarly, when TCI is
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treated as the predicted variable, the chi-square statistics of 0.020, 0.118, 0.442,
0.058 and 0.232, respectively for LNRGDPE, IFI, GEFe, RGDPEGEFe and IFIGEFe
are not significant (see also Appendix A). The implication of this also is that the
null hypothesis of block exogeneity cannot be refuted when TCI is taken as the
dependent variable.
Table 3: Toda-Yamamoto Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
Dependent variable: LNRGDPE
Excluded

Chi-sq

df

Prob.

TCI

7.352504

2

0.0253

IFI

2.135088

2

0.3439

GEFE
RGDPEGEFE

8.269739
5.730449

2
2

0.0160
0.0570

IFIGEFE

2.892087

2

0.2355

All

27.41441

10

0.0022

Excluded

Chi-sq

Df

Prob.

LNRGDPE

0.020115

2

0.9900

IFI
GEFE
RGDPEGEFE

0.118405
0.442349
0.058168

2
2
2

0.9425
0.8016
0.9713

IFIGEFE

0.232326

2

0.8903

All

11.03876

10

0.3545

Excluded

Chi-sq

Df

Prob.

LNRGDPE

8.151152

2

0.0170

TCI

7.290444

2

0.0261

GEFE
RGDPEGEFE

8.927683
6.986030

2
2

0.0115
0.0304

IFIGEFE

10.16282

2

0.0062

All

58.58364

10

0.0000

Chi-sq

Df

Prob.

Dependent variable: TCI

Dependent variable: IFI

Dependent variable: GEFE
Excluded
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LNRGDPE

0.405461

2

0.8165

TCI

1.719642

2

0.4232

IFI
RGDPEGEFE

1.556344
0.323598

2
2

0.4592
0.8506

IFIGEFE

1.637462

2

0.4410

All

7.843053

10

0.6442

Dependent variable: RGDPEGEFE
Excluded

Chi-sq

Df

Prob.

LNRGDPE

0.014613

2

0.9927

TCI

1.571198

2

0.4558

IFI

1.143261

2

0.5646

GEFE

1.056546

2

0.5896

IFIGEFE

1.136615

2

0.5665

All

13.29596

10

0.2076

Dependent variable: IFIGEFE
Excluded

Chi-sq

Df

Prob.

LNRGDPE

9.571365

2

0.0083

TCI

3.563676

2

0.1683

IFI

11.61397

2

0.0030

GEFE
RGDPEGEFE

10.57195
7.838700

2
2

0.0051
0.0199

All

65.08847

10

0.0000

Source: Authors’ estimation, 2019

However, given the high chi-square statistic of 8.269 for institutional quality when
real GDP per person employed is the dependent variable, it suggests that
institutional quality variable (GEFe) is exogenous in the inclusive growth
regression. Similarly, the indicator of comparative advantage conforming (TCI)
and the interacted institutional-inclusive growth variable (RGDPEGEFe), having
the chi-square values of 7.353 and 5.731, equally show that inclusive growth are
respectively Granger-caused by these two variables. However, we found the
evidence of the resources endowment variable (TCI) causing inclusive growth
in the long-run without any feedback relationship observed. In other words,
inclusive growth is collectively influenced by all the explanatory variables. Thus,
the null hypothesis of block exogeneity of non-causality is refuted when
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LNRGDPE is taken as the dependent variable. This implies that a broad-based
economic growth is largely influenced by the quality of institutions of
governance, an inclusive finance, resource-based development strategy (CAC
technology), and the interactive governance variables when these are taken
together.
When IFI and IFIGEFe, respectively, were taken as the dependent variables, the
chi-squares of 8.151 and 9.571 for LNRGDPE were significant. The null hypothesis
of block exogeneity can also be refuted, consistent with the recent suggested
developments in the literature (Khurtz & Schrank, 2007; Levy & Fukuyama, 2010;
Zhuang et al., 2010; Chang, 2011), in which a feedback relationship between
institutional quality and economic development have been reported. However,
IFI and IFIGEFe do not respectively Granger-cause institutional quality (GEFe).
These results partly support the findings of Haq and Zia (2006), Basu and Das
(2010) and Kebede and Takyi (2017) in which uni-directional causality was
reported, either from good governance to economic growth or the other way
around. Our findings, however, indicate that the evidence of feedback effects
was found to be stronger between the interacted variables of institutional quality
and financial inclusion on the one hand, and IFI and the proxy for inclusive
growth on the other hand, depending on the level of development. It was,
however, found that real GDP per person employed (LNRGDPE) neither
Granger-cause institutional quality nor technology choice index. Thus, our
findings revealed that while interacted institutional factor exerts a positive and
bi-directional causal effect on inclusive finance in the long-run, the study found
only a one-way causal relationship from institutional quality and resources
endowment indicators to inclusive growth. However, the strong bi-directional
causality relationship between the interacted institutional variable and index of
financial inclusion confirms the findings of Khurtz & Schrank (2007); Zhuang et al.
(2010); and Chang (2011), who found evidence of two-way causal relationship
between institutional quality and economic development for some group of
countries.
Furthermore, the finding of strong uni-directional causality running from
institutional quality through financial inclusion to inclusive growth is in line with
the findings of La Portal et al. (1998) and Glaesier et al. (2004), but differs from
that of Levy and Fukuyama (2010) and Onwusu and Odhambo (2014) for some
developing economies. The implications of this in the short-run are that efforts to
improve institutional governance in Nigeria would have positive impact on the
socio-economic life of the citizens, including the extreme poor and the most
vulnerable individuals. In consonance with the a-priori expectation, institutional
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quality was found to be the fundamental cause of a broad-based productive
employment growth, having relatively significant causal effects on both formal
financial services (availability and usage of formal banking services) and
inclusive growth during the period investigated. The only plausible explanation
for these fairly positive results might partly be the transition to democratic
governance since 1998.
From the results of the diagnostic tests conducted and reported in Appendix B,
the Breusch- Godfrey Langrange Multiplier (LM) test for all the VAR models did
not reject the null hypothesis, which stated that ‘there is no serial correlation’.
This indicated that the error terms were not serially correlated at the 95 per cent
confidence intervals. Similarly, the results of the heteroscedasticity tests (with no
cross terms) did not reject the null hypothesis of ‘homoscedasticity’. This implied
that the error terms had constant variance, as the disturbances satisfied the
equal variance assumption. However, the Ramsey RESET test did not reject the
null hypothesis of ‘no misspecification in all the estimated equations, confirming
that the models were free of specification errors. These results indicated that the
short-run models passed all the relevant diagnostic tests, since there could be
no suspicion of multicolinearity among the variables when the functional forms
of the models were well specified and the disturbances had equal variances.
Moreover, the problem of endogeneity was largely unexpected when the error
terms were serially uncorrelated, with the regressors being the lagged values.
Employing the cumulative sum (CUSUM) and cumulative sum of squares
(CUSUMSQ) tests utilised by Pesaran & Shin (1998), the study also estimated the
recursive coefficients of the residuals to test for the stability of the long-run
estimated parameters. In Appendix C, it can be inferred from Figure 4 that the
plot of CUSUM stays within the critical 5 per cent bounds that confirms the longrun relationships among variables and thus shows the stability of coefficients.
However, CUSUMSQ statistics exceed the 5 per cent critical bounds of
parameter stability, thus indicating instability of the coefficients and which only
seems appropriate to be attributed to several factors such as socio-structural
problems like insecurity (insurgency/terrorism, kidnapping, banditry), institutional
corruption as well as very weak democratic framework in Nigeria, particularly
between 2007 and 2013.
The policy implications based on the Lin’s growth identification and facilitation
framework for a resource-rich and labour-abundant developing countries like
Nigeria, is that more credible institutional capacities and competencies are
required to anchor and coordinate an inclusive growth-enhancing process over
a longer term. In addition, the inverse relationship between institutional quality
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and the preferred development strategy index, and the feed-back evidence
existing between the interacted institutional-financial variable calls for an
uppermost policy-concern of any inclusive growth-oriented institutional
leadership that would effectively tackle those peculiar tripartite socio-economic
challenges earlier discussed.

V.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

This paper investigated the causal interactions among the institutional, financial
and inclusive growth variables in Nigeria and the extent to which the proposition
of factor endowment structure holds within the institutional quality framework for
the period 1998-2017.
The study concluded that institutional quality had a significant causal effect on
financial inclusion and inclusive growth in Nigeria. Therefore, by virtue of its
relative capacity to create equitable socio-economic opportunities, state
institutions could play a vital role in mobilising both human and natural resources
in the country to achieve the much-desired broad-based productive
employment growth. It is, therefore, recommended that institutional
improvement beyond the present liberal democratic threshold is much needed
to effectively harness the human capital resource base. Specifically, the
Nigerian government should adopt a labour-intensive development strategy
such that poor active households are comprehensively integrated into
productive activities for optimal value-chain finance-growth inclusiveness. This
should be able to address the protracted tripartite socio-economic problems of
poverty, inequality and unemployment in line with Lin’s comparative advantage
conforming hypothesis.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Toda-Yamamoto Granger Causality Tests
Dependent Variables in the Regression
Regressor
LNRGDPE IFI
TCI
GEFe RGDPEGEFe
LNRGDPE
0.00
0.02 0.99 0.82
0.99

IFIGEFe
0.01

IFI
TCI

0.34
0.03

0.00
0.03

0.94
0.00

0.46
0.42

0.56
0.46

0.00
0.17

GEFe
RGDPEGEFe
IFIGEFe
JOINT

0.02
0.06
0.23
0.00

0.01
0.03
0.01
0.00

0.80
0.97
0.89
0.36

0.00
0.85
0.44
0.64

0.59
0.00
0.57
0.21

0.01
0.02
0.00
0.00

P-Values Reported

Appendix B: Diagnostic Tests
Test
F-statistic
2
X SERIAL
3.0767
2
X BREUSCH-PAGAN-GODFREY
1.2580
X2 WHITE
0.9898
2
X RAMSEY
2.7165
NORMALITY TEST

Probability
0.3915
0.4474
0.5567
0.1979
0.8090

Note: X2 Serial is for serial correlation. X2 ARCH is for autorgressive conditional heteroscedasticity. X2
WHITE is for white heteroscedasticity and X2 RAMSEY for Ramsey Reset test.
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Appendix C: Recursive of the Residuals (CUSUM and CUSUMSQ)
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